By Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar
This publication constitutes the completely refereed post-proceedings of the sixth overseas Workshop on Agent-Mediated digital trade, AMEC 2006, held in manhattan, long island, united states in July 2004 as a part of AAMAS 2004.
The 15 revised complete papers awarded have been rigorously chosen from 39 submissions in the course of rounds of reviewing and revision. The papers compile novel paintings from such varied fields as laptop technological know-how, Operations examine, synthetic Intelligence and dispensed structures that concentrate on modeling, implementation and assessment of computational buying and selling establishment and/or agent options over a various set of products. they're prepared in topical sections on mechanism layout, buying and selling brokers, and instruments.
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Extra info for Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York,
Jennings of infimums in equations 2 and 3. With these changes, the mechanism still conserves both its computational and economic properties in the task allocation scenario. Our future work in this area concerns two issues. The first issue will concentrate on how to design mechanisms which take into consideration multi-dimensional signals. Such signals are known to better characterise the preferences of agents in certain MAS such as in a procurement auction where both the price and date of delivery are important .
Vickrey: “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of Finance 16, pp. 8-37, 1961 An Options-Based Method to Solve the Composability Problem in Sequential Auctions Adam I. Juda and David C. edu Abstract. Current auctions often expose bidding agents to two difficult, yet common, problems. First, bidding agents often have the opportunity to participate in successive auctions selling the same good, with no dominant bidding strategy in any single auction. Second, bidding agents often need to acquire a bundle of goods by bidding in multiple auctions, again with no dominant bidding strategy in any single auction.
H. Clarke: “Multipart pricing of public goods,” Public Choice 11, pp. 17-33, 1971 6. E. Ephrati and J. S. Rosenschein: “The Clarke tax as a consensus mechanism among automated agents,” Proceedings of the 9th National Conference on Artiﬁcial Intelligence, pp. 173-178, San Jose, California, July 1991. 7. J. J. Laﬀont: “Incentives in public decision making,” Studies in Public Economics 1, North-Holland, 1979 8. T. 617-663, 1973 9. H. Moulin: “Axioms of Cooperative Decision-making,” Econometric Society Monographs15, Cambridge University Press, 1988 10.
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce VI: Theories for and Engineering of Distributed Mechanisms and Systems, AAMAS 2004 Workshop, Amec 2004, New York, by Peyman Faratin, Juan A. Rodríguez-Aguilar